



Outlines


Soundary State


3


- Motivation
- A brief history of academic thought
- The Model
 - Equilibrium under complete information
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






















The Model



2. A separating equilibrium under asymmetric information

• For IRs:

Cases	IRs	Benefit principle
(I) Insufficient fiscal inputs by upper-level government and ask local governments to bear the expenditure responsibility	$\tau^i > \theta^i u(y^i)$ X	x 0 0 0
(II) Areas that receive full transfer payments from upper-level government	$\tau^i = \theta^i u(y^i)$	
(III) A combination of fiscal decentralization, local autonomy and accountability	$\tau^{i} = \theta^{i} u(y^{i})$ o $\tau^{i} = \theta^{i} u(y^{i})$ o	
(IV) Corrective design of misaligned ecological compensation mechanism		
(V) The reverse adjustment of fiscal interests under the "free rider" of administrative power arrangement	$\tau^i \underset{X}{\stackrel{\in}{\Rightarrow}} \theta^i u(y^i)$	х
		13




The Model



2. A separating equilibrium under asymmetric information

• Lemma 1: If the preferences of residents of the lower-level government jurisdiction for public services are not known to the higher-level government, and the higher-level government wants to achieve a separating equilibrium through different combinations of fiscal affairs and expenditure responsibilities, the combination provided to the low-type jurisdiction satisfies the benefit principle, and the combination provided to the high-type jurisdiction will benefit from it.



The Model



2. A separating equilibrium under asymmetric information

• **Proposition 3**: If the preferences of residents of the lower-level government jurisdiction for public services are not known to the higher-level government, and the higher-level government wants to achieve a separating equilibrium through different combinations of fiscal affairs and expenditure responsibilities. In the scheme provided to high-type jurisdictions, the quantity of public goods meets the level of efficiency, but the expenditure responsibility is lower than the level of the benefit principle, while in the scheme provided to the low-type jurisdiction, the quantity of public goods is lower than the efficiency provision level, but the expenditure responsibility meets the level of the benefit principle.

The Model 3. Other equilibria				
High-type	(y^{H*}, τ^{H*})	0	Х	
Low-type	(y^{L*}, τ^{L*})	Х	0	
High-type	$(\tilde{y}, \tilde{\tau})$	Х	Х	
Low-type	$(\tilde{y}, \tilde{\tau})$	0	0	
High-type	$(\bar{y}, \bar{\tau})$	0	0	
Low-type	(0,0)	Х	0	
	Schemes High-type Low-type High-type Low-type High-type	SchemesHigh-type (y^{H*}, τ^{H*}) Low-type (y^{L*}, τ^{L*}) High-type $(\tilde{y}, \tilde{\tau})$ Low-type $(\tilde{y}, \tilde{\tau})$ High-type $(\bar{y}, \bar{\tau})$	SchemesThe efficiency of public goods provisionHigh-type (y^{H*}, τ^{H*}) OLow-type (y^{L*}, τ^{L*}) XHigh-type $(\tilde{y}, \tilde{\tau})$ XLow-type $(\tilde{y}, \tilde{\tau})$ OHigh-type $(\tilde{y}, \tilde{\tau})$ OHigh-type $(\tilde{y}, \tilde{\tau})$ O	

Conclusion



- Conclusion
 - In order to meet the heterogeneous needs of residents in different jurisdictions for public services, the principle of benefit must be taken as the benchmark principle for the design of fiscal relationship mechanism, and the compatibility of fiscal power and expenditure responsibility.
 - Reduce the direct intervention and allocation of affairs and expenditure responsibilities by the functional departments of central and provincial governments under the vertical management system.

